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FIRST AND LAST CHANCE: LOOKING 
FOR LESBIANS IN FIFTIES 
BAR CASES 
JOAN W. HOWARTH* 
Do all of us who choose members of our own sex as objects of 
desire and as sexual partners share some meaningful common iden-
tity, such as "homosexual," "gay" or perhaps "queer"? The classifica-
tions "homosexual" and "gay" claim for themselves just that kind of 
inclusiveness; that is, that the gay world includes people of all races, 
all classes and any possible gender identity. You, me, James Baldwin, 
Gertrude Stein, J. Edgar Hoover: we are all gay together. In this way 
"homosexual" or "gay" is a generic term, like, for example, "human 
being." But we know that the alleged inclusiveness masks just the 
opposite: the classification "homosexual" or "gay" highlights sexual 
orientation related to object choice and simultaneously submerges 
race, class and gender. By common understanding, the classification 
"lesbian" reveals gender, but race and class remain erased, hidden. 
This essay explores a specific site in gay legal history, as reflected 
in four appellate cases from California's efforts during the fifties to 
shut down gay bars by revoking liquor licenses.1 My goal is to peel 
back the generic "gay" in those cases to reveal the omnipresent sexual 
orientation, gender, class and racial identities that determined what it 
meant to be "homosexual" in California during the fifties, and that 
intersect within each of us today. 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. J.D. 1980, University of Southern Califor-
nia; B.A. 1972, Smith College. I thank Marlys Bergstrom and Elizabeth Ring for excellent 
research assistance. 
1. For discussions of lesbian bars in the fifties, see LILUAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND 
TWIUGHT LoVERS 159-75 (1991); EUZABETH LApOVSKY KENNEDY & MAoEUNE D. DAVIS, 
BOOTS OF LEATHER, SUPPERS OF GOLD: THE HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 29-112 
(1993); AUDRE LOROE, ZAMI: A NEW SPELUNG OF My NAME 176-84 (1982); JOAN NESTLE, A 
RESTRICTED COUNTRY 74-77, 100-09 (1987). See generally JOHN D'EMIUO, SEXUAL POLmcs, 
SEXUAL COMMUNmES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 
1940-1970 (1983). 
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My focus on the bars is in part a choice to highlight lesbian sexu-
ality: dancing, flirtation and desire. This is a sober story, however, 
because it reminds us of the agony of a culture of resistance built on 
alcoholism and repression, and exploited by entrepreneurs, the bar 
owners - the plaintiffs in these cases. 
The story is also sobering because it tracks legal repression 
becoming worse, not better, over time. In many ways, the fifties were 
a terrible time for gay men and lesbians. The relative freedom of the 
World War II years was followed by crackdowns on subversion and 
perversion, intertwined in the rhetoric of American leaders. Homo-
sexuals, including lesbians, start out in 1951, in Stoumen v. Reilly2 as 
"human beings," albeit generic, unsexed, unraced and unclassed 
human beings, with civil rights recognized by the California Supreme 
Court. By the end of the decade, in Vallerga v. Department of Alco-
holic Beverage Control,3 the same court particularized its representa-
tion of homosexuals by including indicia of sexual orientation, gender, 
class and sometimes race, but also reduced these "human beings" to 
"sexual perverts." "Sexual perverts," of course, have fewer rights 
than "human beings." 
This transformation in the law from human being to sexual per-
vert is a sober journey with stops at four bars. The first is the once-
famous Black Cat, located in San Francisco's North Beach, the bar at 
issue in Stoumen. At the license revocation hearing, its owner, Sol 
Stoumen, described the Black Cat as "one of the few remaining color-
ful Bohemian traditions in the City of San Francisco."4 Stoumen 
offered proof that the real reason the Department of Alcoholic Bever-
age Control ("ABC") shut down the Black Cat was his ongoing dis-
pute with the bartenders' union.s However, the official ground for the 
2. Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1951). 
3. Vallerga v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1959). 
4. Clerk's Transcript at 6, Stoumen (No. S.F. 18310); see also John D'Emilio, Gay Politics 
and Community in San Francisco Since World War II, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMINO 
TIiE GAY & LESBIAN PAST 456, 463-64 (Martin Duberman et al. eds., 1989) (describing the 
influence of the Black Cat and its prominent drag entertainer, Jos~ Sarria, subsequently the first 
openly gay mayoral candidate in San Francisco). 
5. Appellant's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court at 11-13, Stoumen (No. S.F. 
18310). Until the California Supreme Court opinion, the vast majority of the litigation was taken 
up by Stoumen's outrage at having been deceived by the ABC. Stoumen had arranged to settle 
the matter with the ABC Director, and had been assured that the hearing was pro forma. Stou-
men showed up and lost his license after an actual hearing took place on whether the Black Cat 
was, in fact, a meeting place for homosexuals. Jd. In other words, Stoumen's main arguments 
were estoppel or procedural due process theories based on the unfairness of a "fix" not holding. 
Jd.; see also HERB CAIN, BAOHDAD BY TIiE BAY: A COLORFUL, ENTERTAININO, PROFILE OF < 
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loss of license was that the Black Cat offended public morals. This 
was based on San Francisco Police Inspector Frank Murphy's testi-
mony that it was "50 percent homos going in there, and 50 percent 
tourist .... "6 Sol Stoumen's adamant defense was that he ejected all 
the "homos."7 
In spite of their client's rampant homophobia, Stoumen's attor-
neys presented human rights arguments, backed up by three volumes 
of the Kinsey report8 filed as exhibits. Their important victory at the 
California Supreme Court has been identified by Professor Patricia 
Cain as the probable "first successful American 'gay rights' case."9 
The California Supreme Court announced in Stoumen that 
although the State had authority to revoke a liquor license to protect 
"public welfare and morals," the fact that a bar was a meeting place 
for homosexuals was not sufficient grounds for license revocation. 
Mter all, preached the court, homosexuals "are human beings" too.10 
The California Supreme Court cited an Oklahoma decision finding 
prostitutes to be human beings: "The [Oklahoma] court pointed out 
that such women are human beings entitled to shelter and that it is not 
a crime to give them lodging unless it is done for immoral purposes. 
The same reasoning applies to the patronage of a public restaurant 
and bar by homosexuals."ll 
How, then, does Stoumen, the landmark gay rights victory, repre-
sent or describe homosexuals? Homosexuals are human beings -
LIFE, PEPPLE, AND PLACES IN MODERN SAN FRANCISCO 169, 177-78 (1949) (describing the 
Black Cat as an intellectuaVartist hangout picketed daily because the bartenders doubled as 
waiters). 
6. Respondent's Brief at 19, Stoumen (No. S.F. 18310); see also, Terry Hansen, Don't Call 
Us "Queer City", MEN, Apr. 1955, reprinted in MARTIN DUBERMAN, ABOUT TIME: EXPLORING 
THE GAY PAST 184-86 (1986) (recounting events "told to" Terry Hansen, a journalist, by Lt. 
Eldon Beardon, then Chief of the Sex Crimes Squad of the San Francisco Police Department, 
and describing arrests of gay men, including arrests by Officer Frank Murphy). 
7. Appellant's Reply Brief at 14, Stoumen (No. SF 18310). 
8. ALFRED C. KINSEY, ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948). The 
famous Kinsey reports had been recently published. They purported to separately describe the 
"human male" and "human female," although the chapter on male homosexuality claimed that 
lesbian activities "are quite the equivalent of sexual relations between males." Furthermore, the 
studies regarding homosexuality in the "human male" were based entirely on white subjects. See 
id. at 611. 
9. Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. 
REV. 1551, 1567 (1993). 
10. Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 971 (quoting Patterson v. State, 132 P. 693, 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1913». 
11. Id. 
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human beings who are entitled to engage in "[e]ven habitual or regu-
lar meetings ... for purely social and harmless purposes, such as the 
consumption of food and drink."12 How does this most important gay 
rights case represent lesbians? Sex is simultaneously missing and very 
present. Sex is missing in that no distinction is made by the courts, the 
lawyers or the police, between gay men and lesbians. 
In this false confiation of lesbians and gay men, Stoumen is not 
very different from gay rights decisions of our day. That the false and 
misleading erasure of differences between gay men and lesbians is so 
well-entrenched suggests something even deeper than the general ten-
dency of men13 to notice men. Similarly, the invisibility of sex and 
gender differences, even within the modern category of "gay men and 
lesbians," suggests a deep-seated, false, heterosexist notion that lesbi-
ans are not real women and gay men are not real men, and therefore 
both groups can be lumped somewhere in the middle between the per-
ceived polar opposites of male and female.14 
On the other hand, in a complex, weird way, sex is everything in 
Stoumen, as in all gay rights cases. Sex - and sexual attraction to the 
wrong one, the same one - is the defining characteristic of the 
category. 
Sex is not the only identifier missing from the hopeful, but empty, 
representation of homosexuals as human beings provided by the Stou-
men court. What race a lesbian might be, or really anything else about 
lesbians or gay men, is also missing. As is typical in liberal thought, 
the Stoumen court stripped lesbians of all particularity, all uniqueness 
and all diversity, and reduced them to their core: human beings with 
the right to gather, eat and drink. Thus marks one way to begin the 
problematic status/conduct dichotomy. The liberal notion of rights is 
that everyone has them, even prostitutes and lesbians, as long as they 
12. Id. 
13. The police officers, lawyers, bartenders, ABC agents, commissioners and hearing 
officer, as well as the judges deciding the case at the superior court, court of appeal and supreme 
court levels, were all men. See Stoumen, 234 P.2d at 969. 
14. With the possible exception of family law cases, where the category "gay" bumps into 
gendered categories of "mother" and "father," gay and lesbian rights are litigated by gays and 
lesbians as if gender differences do not matter. From the briefs before the Supreme Court in 
Bowers v. Hardwick, to the military decisions, to the fifties bar cases, any differences between 
the lives of women who love other women and men who love other men disappear. I spent 
hours reading the records of these cases before I realized that the "First and Last Chance" was 8 
lesbian bar. In this error, these cases from the fifties are not very different from the litigation on 
behalf of gay men and lesbians today, in which we continue to overuse the category of "gay men 
and lesbians." 
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are understood to be human beings. When conduct is added, or iden-
tifying characteristics are added, however, those rights can erode, 
sometimes very quickly. In the fifties bar cases, as soon as lesbians 
became anything more distinguishable than "human beings," they lost 
their inalienable rights to eat, drink and be gay. 
It happened quickly. The California legislature was unhappy with 
the California Supreme Court's characterization of homosexuals as 
human beings, preferring the alternative (but still gender-neutral) cat-
egory "sexual perverts." Under the leadership of then-Assemblyman 
Casper Weinberger, the legislature responded to Stoumen with a 
unanimously-passed amendment to the operative Business and Pro-
fessions Code section, effective September 7, 1955, that provided for 
revocation of a liquor license for anyone operating a "resort for . . . 
sexual perverts."15 
So much for the inalienable rights of human beings. 
Kershaw v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,16 the first 
appellate case to test this new statute, concerned Pearl's, a bar in 
downtown Oakland. Searching for lesbians in Pearl's, or in Kershaw, 
proves more successful than in Stoumen, because the court in Kershaw 
provided detailed descriptions of the patrons. Unfortunately, the 
descriptions served to define sexual perversion. 
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24200(e) (West 1955) (subsequently amended in 1963). 
This version of the statute provided for revocation of the liquor license: 
Where the portion of the premises of the licensee upon which the activities permitted 
by the license are conducted are a resort for illegal possessors or users of narcotics, 
prostitutes, pimps, panderers, or sexual perverts. In addition to any other legally com-
petent evidence, the ch~racter of the premises may be proved by the general reputation 
of the premises in the community as a resort of illegal possessors or users of narcotics, 
prostitutes, pimps, panderers, or sexual perverts. , 
Id. See Nickola v. Munro, 328 P.2d 271, 271 n.t (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Kershaw v. Dep't of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control, 318 P.2d 494, 495 n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). 
The operative category in the legislation is gender-neutral: sexual perverts. Although the 
category of "sexual perverts" could include others as well, e.g., pedophiles, the legislative con-
cern about liquor being served at "resorts for sexual perverts" apparently limited the class to gay 
men and lesbians who seemed to be the only ones who gathered in sufficient numbers to invoke 
the prohibition. This section was unanimously repealed in 1963, at the ABC's request, which 
(erroneously) claimed that the repeal was required by the Val/ergo decision. See Letter from 
Philip J. Hanley, Area Administrator, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, to Governor 
Edmund G. (Pat) Brown (June 18, 1963) (California Legislative Archives, Sacramento, Califor-
nia); see also Memorandum from Paul Ward, Legislative Aide, to Governor Edmund G. (Pat) 
Brown (June 21, 1963) (describing the bill as making "technical non-substantive corrections") 
(California Legislative Archives, Sacramento, California). 
16. Kershaw, 318 P.2d 494. 
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The first distinction added in Kershaw was sex. Men who danced, 
kissed and otherwise paired up with other men were noted,17 as were 
women who danced and otherwise paired up with other women.18 
This marks the beginning of the move away from "human being." 
Although much of the explicit desctiptions concerned men,19 lesbians 
emerged. The specifically lesbian activity reported in Kershaw con-
sisted of two occasions, six months apart, in which a woman (different 
each time) sat on another woman's lap and thighs were rubbed.20 
Lesbians emerged; sex was noted. Lesbians are human beings, or 
sexual perverts" who are women. Lesbians, as represented in Ker-
shaw, sit on one another's laps and rub thighs for sexual pleasure. We 
might also infer that they drink alcohol and hang out in bars, specifi-
cally a bar in downtown Oakland. Hanging out at Pearl's suggests 
some class definition; lesbians in Kershaw were working-class women. 
17. Although the appellate opinion includes few specifics, evidence in the record of perver-
sion at Pearl's included that two men "kiss[ed] continuously without any break for 80 seconds." 
Reporter's Transcript at 111-12, quoted in Appellant's Opening Brief at 20, Kershaw (No. 17693). 
18. Kershaw, 318 P.2d at 496. 
19. For example, although men danced with men and women danced with women, only 
male couples were described as dancing "cheek to cheek in close embrace." lei. 
lei. 
There were numerous incidents of male couples kissing one another. Some danced 
with their legs intertwined. In many instances both arms were wrapped around the 
partner's buttocks with loins pressed tightly against each other. Occasionaly [sic], a 
couple would stop dancing and engage in gyrations of the body with each partner's 
loins rubbing against the other partner's loins. 
Much of the evidence at the hearing level concerned generic, ungendered, "homosexuals." 
For example, the evidence included an affidavit from Oakland Police Department Deputy Chief 
Thomas J. Rogers stating that officers had been checking Pearl's for at least two years and that 
"Pearl's has been known to be a place frequented by homosexuals" who had been "observed 
embracing each other, kissing one another, fondling each other's private parts, and deporting 
themselves as sexual degenerates." Affidavit of Thomas J. Rogers, dated Jan. 8,1957, attached 
to 'Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Kershaw (No. 17693). Deputy Chief Rogers also reported 
that he "had received several complaints from parents regarding their minor children conversing 
about visiting said Pearl's." lei. 
20. On May 28 or 29 one woman was observed sitting on another woman's lap. The 
latter had her hand on the other's thigh near her privates and was rubbing her hand up 
and down. On November 19 a similar incident occurred with two other women. 
Kershaw, 318 P.2d at 496. 
The lower court files also disclose more about one of the lap-sitting incidents involving 
lesbians. "One female, Orinda E. Pereira [sic], was seated on the lap of Dorothy Gardner. Dor-
othy worked her hand up Lorinda's leg and rested it in the vicinity of Lorinda's privates (both 
subjects were arrested by the [Oakland Police Department], charging violation of section 657.5, 
P.C. - Lewd Vag.)." Accusation, Count I(b), Kershaw (No. 17693). The evidence amassed 
against Pearl's included barely legible Municipal Court Docket Sheets that showed that Pereira 
and Gardner were each arrested pursuant to California Penal Code section 647.5, pleaded not 
guilty to that, subsequently pleaded guilty to California Penal Code § 650, and on November 3, 
1955, received suspended 30 day sentences. Accusation, Kershaw (No. 278,421). 
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Race, however, was erased in both Stoumen and Kershaw. Nobody's 
ra~e was mentioned, neither the whiteness of the attorneys, judges, 
hearing officer and other officials enforcing the morals of the state, 
nor the race of any of the patrons. 
In spite of the ambiguities and general uselessness of the defini-
tion of lesbians in Kershaw, the California Court of Appeal made the 
task of learning how to identify lesbians quite important with its ulti-
mate holding, namely, that gay men and lesbians are sex perverts 
within its "core of meaning to the average person.'>21 The Kershaw 
court described homosexuals or sex perverts as: 
persons who are prone to and do engage in aberrant sexual conduct 
... and ... use this public place as a haunt or gathering place for 
mutual stimulation of their sexually aberrant urges and a place of 
assignation for the renewal of old and the making of new associa-
tions looking toward the consummation of those urges.22 
With that analysis, the court affirmed the decision to shut down 
Pearl's. 
What about Stoumen - the binding authority about homosexuals 
as human beings (like prostitutes)? The Kershaw court distinguished 
Stoumen as dealing merely with conduct that was "harmless and not 
inimical to public welfare or morals. . .. [T]hat is a hypothetical situa-
tion not presented by the facts of this case.,,23 The dancing, lap sitting 
and thigh rubbing patrons of Pearl's no longer were generic human 
beings with their sturdy bundles of rights. Kershaw was about sex per-
verts, men dancing with men, women dancing with women, so Stou-
men did not control.24 
21. Kershaw, 318 P.2d at 498. 
22. Id. at 497. 
23. Id. at 498. 
24. The Kershaw court purported to uphold Stoumen, as it suggested the legislature did, in 
enacting the (apparently contradictory) new California Business & Professions Code, section 
24200(e): 
It would seem a fair inference to conclude that in making that amendment the Legisla-
ture acted in the light of and consjstently with the rule of the Stoumen case, by infer-
ence excluding from the coverage of subdivision (e) the type of conduct which the 
Supreme Court had declared harmless and not inimical to public welfare or morals. 
The court having so recently and with such clarity said it, why should the Legislature 
say it again? However, as we have indicated, that is a hypothetical situation not 
presented by the facts of this case. 
Id. at 498. 
160 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 5:153 
The appellate decision in Kershaw erased race and culture, 
attempting to isolate sexual perversion,25 but the files in the case pro-
vide a little more information. Pearl's featured live organ music 
Thursday through Sunday, largely Latin American style. The 
entertainment also included burlesque female impersonators and 
comics, and perhaps male impersonators.26 
For whatever reason, perhaps because it constituted Stoumen-
type "harmless behavior," the California Appellate Court also ignored 
the extensive evidence offered at the hearing regarding what was said 
to be women dressing like men. The files tell us that on May 28, 1955, 
a "[fJemale employee, one Natalie Correa, worked on the premises 
attired in complete male attire,'>27 for which she was arrested pursuant 
to an Oakland ordinance that prohibited immoral dress.28 Further-
more, on November 18, 1955, between 9:15 and 11:15 p.m., "three 
females dressed in male attire were present on the premises."29 Later, 
between 11:35 and 1:45, "[s]ix females were seated at a table dressed 
in male clothing" and "female couples danced together."30 The next 
night, November 19th, "24 male couples" danced, "two females 
danced together," and "[e]ight females present in male clothing held 
hands, goosed.'o31 
What was this male clothing? ABC agent Laurence Strong testi-
fied that "Pereira had on slacks, as I remember, a cotton sport shirt 
and a jacket similar to a loafer jacket. Mrs. Gardner had on slacks 
also, some sort of a blouse - I don't know what kind - and a regular 
25. For example, the appellate court noted that "the licensee [Pearl Kershaw] goosed one 
of the entertainers and the entertainer said to the licensee 'Are you inclined toward Lesbian-
ism?'" Id. at 496. 
26. For an account of male impersonators, see Lisa E. Davis, The Butch As Drag Artiste: 
Greenwich Village in the Roaring Forties, in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE: A FEMME-BUTCH READER 
45, 45-53 (Joan Nestle ed., 1992). 
27. Affidavit of Oakland Police Department Patrolman Jilion Wesley, attached to Accusa-
tion, Kershaw (No. 278,421). 
28. Oakland, Cal., Ordinance 816 (May 8, 1879), adopted in CITY OF OAKLAND, CAL., 
CHARTER (Jan. 1892). Ordinance 816, prohibiting immoral dress provided, "It [is] unlawful for 
any person [in the City of Oakland] to appear in any public place naked or in a dress not belong-
ing to his or her sex, or in an indecent or lewd dress." Id. 
29. Accusation, Count II, Kershaw (No. 278,421). In addition to the three women in the 
premises, "approximately 24 male couples danced together" and "one male kissed the other 
male's neck during the entire dance." Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. The police officers reported that one week later, "two males seated in a booth held 
each other's hands. Each wore an identical wedding ring and conversed about their marital 
status." Id. 
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woman's coat, knee length."32 Oakland Police Officer Russell B. Mills 
testified that the women wore "pedal-pushers or some kind of 
levi's."33 Much of the evidence against the women patrons came from 
Oakland Policewoman Margery F. Gwinn.34 Officer Gwinn made sev-
eral undercover visits to Pearl's and was there when it was raided and 
patrons were arrested.35 
Now we can add a few names, and even sketchy criminal records, 
to lesbians as represented in these cases. Lesbians were human 
beings, or perhaps sex perverts, who were women, drank in bars, sat 
on each other's laps, danced with other women, dressed like men -
or perhaps sometimes wore pedal-pushers - and were arrested and 
jailed. Based on the records in Kershaw, most of those arrested were 
Latina, or at least, had Spanish surnames. The files in Kershaw also 
help us to identify and describe women who were not lesbians. They 
were dressed in slacks, drank in bars (at least one had several scotch 
and waters, by the record), and did not get arrested and jailed. In fact, 
they were some of the pioneer policewomen in Oakland, including 
Marge Gwinn. . 
Across the Bay, around the same time, some of the same ABC 
agents involved in Kershaw were conducting a surveillance of Hazel's, 
which Hazel Nickola had owned and operated in San Mateo County 
for seventeen years. Hazel's amenities included a forty foot bar and a 
shuffleboard court between the bar area and the dance floor in the 
back.36 Using a legal analysis virtually identical to that in Kershaw, 
32. Hearing Transcript, Testimony of Laurence E. Strong, Kershaw (No. 278,421). 
33. Hearing Transcript, Testimony of Officer Russell Mills, Kershaw (No. 278,421). Pedal-
pushers are identified in some lesbian accounts as the preferred dress of femme lesbians in the 
fifties. See NESTLE, supra note 1 at 100-09. One irony here is that the infamous and extremely 
different butch-femme clothing styles of fifties lesbians apparently were not distinguishable to 
undercover officers who described all the women as "mannishly dressed." See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 10-30, Kershaw (No. 17693). 
34. Appellant's Opening Brief at 10-30, Kershaw (No. 17693). Undercover policewomen 
were a known hazard of lesbian bars. See, e.g., Marge McDonald, From the Diary of Marge 
McDonald (1931-1986), in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE, supra note 26, at 124, 125 (a kindly stranger 
informed Marge McDonald or her friend that no women would talk to them on their first trip to 
the gay bar because "they think you are a policewoman."). 
35. Appellant's Opening Brief at 13-15, Kershaw (No. 17693). Officer Gwinn testified that 
she was at Pearl's until the raid, between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m. She testified that Lorinda Pereira 
was on Dorothy Gardner'S lap "rubbing her up and down," and then "Nora" (a male waiter) sat 
down in Pereira's lap. Hearing Transcript, Testimony of Officer Margery F. Gwinn, Kershaw 
(No. 278,421). 
36. Reporter's Transcript at 2-3, Nickola v. Munro, 328 P.2d 271 (Cal. a. App. 1958) (No. 
1 Civ. 18014). Shuffleboard was featured in at least one other lesbian bar at that time. See 
McDonald, supra note 34, at 125 (describing going to a lesbian bar in Columbus, Ohio, on March 
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the California Court of Appeal upheld Hazel's license revocation in 
Nickola v. Munro.37 The Nickola court accepted the Deputy Attorney 
General's invitation to circumvent Stoumen: "By reason of their pecu-
liar physical and psychological make up and personality they have no 
right to insist upon equal privileges with normal law abiding, healthy 
citizens. "38 
Although the legal analysis repeats that of Kershaw, Nickola adds 
a bit to our search for lesbians. Most of the appellate court's descrip-
tions concerned the male patrons, who constituted over ninety percent 
of the customers.39 Two men of color were mentioned particularly: a 
white man kissed a Filipino man, and another man briefly fondled a 
Negro man.40 The court in Nickola placed so little focus on the lesbi-
ans that they were nominally excluded from the court's definition of 
"sex pervert," which referred to a "male" seeking sexual gratification 
from another male in a public tavern.41 
However, the court did mention women: "The few female 
patrons were dressed in mannish attire, and most of them danced with 
each other."42 We also learn that women were arrested; the Sheriff 
31, 1955, where "there was a long bar running down the left side of the room, a jukebox at the 
back, and shuffleboard up front .... "). 
37. Nickoia, 328 P.2d 271. 
.38. Respondent's Brief at 48, Nickoia (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
39. The appellate court gave us a report on Hazel's, garnered from ABC agents and Sher-
iff's deputies who visited the bar "on at least seven occasions" between January 7, 1956 and 
February 18th of the same year. Nickoia, 328 P.2d at 272. ABC Agent Strong testified that on 
February 10, 1956, there were 100 to 150 patrons in Hazel's, only 12 to 15 of whom were women. 
(Evidence of too many males in the bars was proof of sexual perversion, but just normal operat-
ing procedure in, for example, the California legislature.) The appellate court provided fairly 
detailed descriptions of the activities of the men at Hazel's: 
Id. 
There was almost continuous dancing taking place during these visits. The vast major-
ity of dancers were men dancing with other men in close and affectionate embrace. 
Many of the men had their arms wrapped around each other's waists, or shoulders, or 
buttocks. Many men were observed kissing or fondling or biting each other, or holding 
hands, and other men were seen sitting on the laps of their male companions and kiss-
ing and fondling each other. • .. Some of the male dancers, while dancing, wrapped 
their arms around the buttocks of their companions and vigorously rotated their pelvic 
areas, to the evident enjoyment of other patrons. Men were seen powdering their 
faces, talking in effeminate voices, and generally acting like over-affectionate females. 
40. Id. at 273. 
41. "[W]hen one male, by acts of the type here involved, seeks sexual gratification from 
another in a public tavern, he has committed acts of sex perversion and demonstrated that he is a 
sex pervert." Id. at 276. 
42. Id. at 272. The testimony at the license revocation hearing was more detailed. Accord-
ing to Agent Strong, "A majority of the female patrons were dressed in mannish attire with 
slacks, sport coats, men's tight sport shirts, and low heeled oxfords, men's type shoes, or loafers. 
1995] FIRST AND LAST CHANCE 163 
conducted a raid on February 19,1956, and "[o]fthe 225 patrons then 
present, 78 men, 10 women and 2 juveniles were arrested."43 
"Lesbian" again included mannish attire, dancing with other 
women and being arrested. Among the women, race was once again 
erased from the opinion. Class was erased, except to the extent that it 
can be inferred from the fact of being in a bar. Of course, class and 
race were present, but hidden. 
Class differences were embedded in the Nickola court's distinc-
tion between "things" done in private and the same things when 
"done in a public tavern," which, according to the court, distinguish a 
These women danced together, and occasionally they would dance with male patrons." Respon-
dent's Brief at 5, Nickola (No.1 Civ. 18014). According to the agent, the women wore "male 
attire - slacks or sport jackets." Reporter's Transcript at 9, Nickola (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
The bar owner's attorney asked the question we want to ask: "Were their slacks different 
from any slacks that a woman wears?" The agent explained, "Some of them were pleated and 
were identical with a man's type of slack, and some of them wore zipper jackets, a man's suede 
zipper jacket or leather jacket Some wore regular sport coats." Reporter's Transcript at 30, 
Nickola (No. 1 Civ. 18014). He further stated, "The females all wore slacks. Some who arrived 
at one point there with a crowd of about 20 from a motorcycle group wore leather jackets and 
jeans and men's shirts and boots, about ten-inch motorcycle boots. They all had short haircuts." 
Reporter's Transcript at 14, Nickola (No. 1 Civ. 18014). However, on cross-examination, the 
agent described these women as wearing "mannish attire" but conceded that they were attired 
like "any other women you might have seen in other places, [in] similar [motorcycle] groups." 
Reporter's Transcript at 31, Nickola (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
The agent also testified that females were dancing with females, and were "dressed in some 
male attire - sport coat, sport shirt. I recall one with a sweatshirt and slacks, denim trousers." 
Reporter's Transcript at 18, Nickola (No.1 Civ. 18014). Upon cross-examination, the agent 
admitted that dancing was all he saw. Id. at 20. The ABC agent had had about six drinks (whis-
key and water) during this visit to Hazel's. Reporter's Transcript at 24, Nickola (No. 1 Civ. 
18014). 
The growing literature on lesbian bar dress during the fifties includes Davis, supra note 26, 
at 49 (discussing fifties police raids on women dressing as men; three articles of female clothing 
were required) and Leslie Feinberg, Butch to Butch: A Love Song, in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE, 
supra note 26, at 80, 81 ("I wore a blue-and-red-striped dress shirt, navy blue jacket to hide my 
breasts, black pressed chinos, and sneakers, because I had no dress shoes."). 
43. Nickola, 328 P.2d at 273. On cross-examination the agent conceded that there were 
approximately 250 people in the bar at the time of the raid, only three of whom turned out to be 
underage. Reporter's Transcript at 33, Nickola (No.1 Civ. 18014). In addition to losing its 
license for operating a resort for sexual perverts, the license also was revoked because an under-
age patron had been served a cognac. The patron, four months shy of his twenty-first birthday, 
testified that he had ordered a "CaIso" (mineral water) but had been given a cognac. Id. at 45. 
When the agent tried to get him to say that he had come all the way from Santa Rosa because 
Hazel's had a reputation as a homosexual bar, the young man demurred. Instead, he character-
ized the bar as "exceedingly unusual," "a certain type," "exceedingly informal," and finally, as 
attracting "a certain type of intellectual." Id. 
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sex pervert.44 Those who can buy privacy are not sex perverts; the 
people in the bar ostensibly are. 
The court also hid both race and class in the arrest figures. 
Assuming that the court was correct that ten percent of the patrons 
were women,45 twenty-two to twenty-five women were in the bar at 
the time of the raid. "Only" ten were arrested. The police and the 
court tell us that all the female patrons were dressed "in mannish 
attire" and most danced with other women. Why were they not 
arrested? Kershaw gives us a hint: perhaps the women who were 
dressed mannishly, paired together and not arrested were not lesbians, 
but police officers. But all of the twelve to fifteen female bar patrons 
who were not arrested could not have been police officers, because 
female agents were not operating in those numbers at the time. We 
know that near that time, San Francisco police officers claimed they 
did not arrest married men caught in the raids on gay bars.46 Could 
most of the women who were dressed mannishly and dancing with 
each other in Hazel's have flashed marriage licenses to invoke compa-
rable marital immunity? 
Of course, other kinds of status routinely created immunity from 
arrest. We know from accounts of New York police raids on lesbian 
bars in the fifties that middle class, especially white, Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant women were not arrested, even as others from the bars 
were led off to often-brutal treatment by the jailers.47 That is, women 
perceived by (white) authorities to have neither racial nor ethnic iden-
tity were not assigned the additional identity of criminal sex pervert. 
Thus, to the extent that a lesbian was a, woman dressed in mannish 
attire, dancing with other women, drinking in a bar, arrested and 
44. Seeking sexual satisfaction in the manner here described in a public tavern offends 
the moral sense of the general public. There are many things that can be done in the 
privacy of the home which may not be illegal, but if done in a public tavern are directly 
offensive to public morals and decency, and demonstrate that the participants are sex 
perverts. 
Nickola, 328 P.2d at 276. 
45. It!. at 272. 
46. Hansen, supra note 6, at 185. 
47. See, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 42, at 91. 
It!. . 
The cops dragged in AI. . .. She was in pretty bad shape. Her shirt was partly open, 
and her pants zipper was down. Her binder was gone, leaving her large breasts free. 
Her hair was wet. There was blood on her mouth and nose. She looked dazed ..•. The 
cops pushed her into the cell. Then they approached me. I backed up until I was up 
against the bars. They stopped and smiled. One cop rubbed his crotch. The other put 
his hands under my armpits and lifted me up three inches off the floor and slammed me 
against the bars. He put his thumbs deep into my breasts and his knee between my 
legs. Everywhere he found my young womanhood and hurt it. 
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carted off to jail, that lesbian was also poor or working class, and she 
probably did not have white skin and expensive clothes. The threat of 
police raids made being in the bars at least a "twitchy experience"48 
for all lesbians; but the actual risk of arrest was defined in large part 
by race and class. 
A lesbian or gay identity is formed, at least in part, in response to, 
or in resistance of, oppression. After all, standing by itself, one's 
object choice of sexual attraction is not necessarily a defining aspect of 
identity. What makes it so is the repression it engenders. The differ-
ence between being hauled off to jail and watching others being 
hauled off is significant and is based more on class and racial catego-
ries than on the category "lesbian." As to that repression, especially 
legal enforcement of societal homophobia, lesbians are not all simi-
larly situated.49 
Perhaps the point can be made stronger by comparing anti-gay 
repression directed at two homosexuals: one male, one female; one 
professionally powerful, one working class; one white and privileged, 
one Latina. At around the time that Natalie Correa was being 
arrested and jailed in Oakland for wearing slacks and sturdy shoes, 
homosexual J. Edgar HooverS° was partying in a private suite in the 
Plaza Hotel in Manhattan with Roy Cohn and others. Hoover was 
"wearing a fluffy black dress, very fluffy, with flounces, and lace stock-
ings and high heels, and a black curly wig. He had makeup on, and 
false eyelashes. It was a very short skirt."51 My point is not to ridicule 
or condemn Hoover's taste in clothing; instead, we should notice that 
a category of "gay" that purports to include both Hoover and Correa 
ignores crucial, determinant differences. Why is same-sex sexual 
desire so defining, so magical, that we can place Hoover and Correa in 
the same category and imagine that they had anything meaningful in 
common? Indeed, some of the patrons of Hazel's and Pearl's were 
48. DEL MARTIN & PHYLLIS LYON, LEsBIAN/WOMAN 11 (1991). 
49. See KENNEDY & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 29-149; LoROE, supra note 1. Both of these 
books explore the tradition, during the forties and fifties, of house parties by and for African-
American lesbians, perhaps reflecting a great need to stay away from the bars. 
50. ANTHONY SUMMERS, OFFICIAL AND CONFIDENTIAL: THE SECRET LIFE OF J.EOGAR 
HOOVER (1993). The top law enforcement official wore perfume, but everyone had to pretend 
he did not. ld. at 88. Truman Capote threatened to write a magazine article about Hoover and 
Clyde Tolson, but finished only the title, Johnny and Clyde. ld. at 81. 
51. ld. at 254. The same witness reported attending a party a year later, also at the Plaza, 
also with Cohn, where Hoover was again dressed as a woman. This time, "He had a red dress on 
••• and a black feather boa around his neck. He was dressed like an old flapper." ld. at 255. 
Hoover then reportedly had sex with young men, this time dressed in leather while wearing 
rubber gloves and reading from his Bible. [d. at 255. 
166 REVIEW OF LAW AND WOMEN'S STUDIES [Vol. 5:153 
treated like the "human beings" that the Stoumen court said they 
were. Most, however, not protected by the privileges of class, race, or 
a badge, became "sex perverts." 
Finally we arrive at the last stop, the First and Last Chance, a 
lesbian bar on Telegraph Avenue in Oakland.52 This was the bar at 
issue in Vallerga v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control,53 the 
1959 California Supreme Court case that closed out the fifties. The 
First and Last Chance gives us the most complete representation of 
lesbians, provides the most powerful critique of the false conduct/sta-
tus dichotomy, and tells us the most about the racing and classing of 
lesbians. 
Wiley Manuel, the California Deputy Attorney General54 who lit-
igated on behalf of the ABC, chose a tone of ironic condescension for 
his description of the goings-on at the First and Last Chance: 
Helen Davis, a policewoman, was on the premises in May of 
1956 with another policewoman, Marge Gwinn. Buddy, a female 
waitress, greeted the policewomen who were later joined by the les-
bian, Shirleen. Shirleen told Marge "you're a cute little butch." 
Shirleen later grabbed Marge and kissed her. Buddy the waitress 
just said to watch it and if they continued to do that they should go 
to the restroom. The next night nothing apparently happened. The 
following night Buddy joined the group again with a trio of sexual 
perverts. Shirleen was not the only girl who took a liking to Marge 
for Buddy had grown quite fond of Marge too. 
. . . . On May 11, 1956 two females this tune were observed by 
Agent Sockyer holding hands affectionately. The only thing normal 
about this pair was that one of the couple used the women [ sic] 
restroom. 
52. Oakland has a rich lesbian tradition, including associations with lesbian writers Ger-
trude Stein, Pat Parker and Judy Grahn. 
53. Vallerga v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d 909 (1959). 
54. The California Bar Association annually recognizes public interest achievement with its 
Wiley Manuel Award, named for this important pioneer in California legal history. Wiley 
Manuel graduated at the top of his class from Hastings and was Editor-in-Chief of the Hastings 
Law Review. He then spent 26 years in the Attorney General's Civil Division, where his work 
included the Vallerga case. In 1976, Governor Jerry Brown appointed Manuel to a judgeship in 
the Alameda County Superior Court. The following year, Governor Brown named Manual to 
become Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, on the same day that the Governor 
appointed former Chief Justice Rose Bird. Wiley Manuel thus became the first African-Ameri-
can (and still only one of three) to serve on the California Supreme Court. See Wiley Manuel, 
53, Dead in California, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1981, at 17. 
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Shirleen was rather fickle. Before slie discovered policewoman 
Marge Gwinn she had kissed another female patron.55 
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The Deputy Attorney General went on to argue that the Business 
and Professions Code section was constitutional, "[n]o matter how 
orderly the perverts are .... "56 He argued that the "evil to be pre-
vented is clearly shown in the evidence" and that the statute was nec-
essary to "protect[] innocent persons from being the object of 
unnatural advances, e.g., the policewoman who was kissed by the les-
bian in this case."57 (That policewoman had gone undercover, in the 
words of the bar owner's attorneys, "disguised as a lesbian."58) 
The court of appeal issued a remarkable opinion that was 
staunchly skeptical of the Deputy Attorney General's impassioned 
arguments. The court found the pairing off and mannish attire rela-
tively inconsequential: 
If entitled to any legal significance, [it] merely emphasized the fact 
that the patrons were homosexuals or lesbians. Of themselves, 
these acts did not amount to immoral, indecent, disgusting or 
improper acts. They merely tended to prove that the patrons were 
homosexuals, a fact the licensee admitted. That fact alone, for rea-
sons already stated, did not justify revoking the license.59 
The court of appeal further emphasized that the paucity of evidence of 
wrongdoing was especially noteworthy given that "some officers 
[namely Helen Davis and Marge Gwinn] visited the First and Last 
Chance almost daily for nine months."60 
That court of appeal opinion was a high point in judicial recogni-
tion and representation of lesbians in that era, or even today. The 
Vallerga court of appeal panel declared that lesbians - working-class 
women, in a bar, paired with other women, dressed mannishly -
were not "immoral, indecent, disgusting, or improper."61 In other 
55. Respondents' Memorandum of Application of Kershaw v. Department of Alcoholic 
Beverage Control at 2-3, Vallerga v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, No. 282,411 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. 1957). 
56. "It is respondents' position that section 24200(e) is constitutional. No matter how 
orderly the perverts are, still the Kershaw case would leave no doubt as to the validity of the 
section where the perverts make the establishment a haunt, as here, for the purpose of stimulat-
ing and gratifying erratic sexual desires and drives." fd. at 4-5. 
57. fd. at 5. 
58. Petition for Modification of Opinion Without Change in the Judgment, and Petition for 
Rehearing at 57m, Vallerga (No. SF 20285). 
59. Vallerga (No.1 Civ. 18184) slip op. at 9 (Cal. Ct. of App. Jan. 27, 1959). 
60. fd. at 9-10. 
61. fd. at 10-11. 
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words, women dressed in slacks, without makeup, pairing up with 
other women, were still human beings. 
The Deputy Attorney General was outraged by the court of 
appeal opinion and filed a scorching petition for rehearing. He threw 
case law at the court upholding prohibitions for sale of alcohol to 
minors, women and Indians. On behalf of the State of California, he 
sputtered and sneered: 
[T]he court apparently does not deem the blatant display of lesbians 
of their strange nature as disgusting. That they paired off, dressed 
in male attire, carressed [sic] one another and even kissed one 
another is treated by this Honorable Court as just wholesome 
activity.62 
The California Supreme Court granted the Attorney General's 
outraged petition for review, and subsequently caused the brave and 
wonderful court of appeal opinion to legally evaporate. 
In its Vallerga opinion, the California Supreme Court also 
reversed the license revocation, reaffirming the Stoumen principle that 
a bar owner would not lose his or her license merely for serving the 
wrong kind of people. The court found Business and Professions 
Code section 24200(e) unconstitutional under Stoumen.63 However, 
even as it purported to uphold Stoumen, the California Supreme 
Court invited the state to shut down gay bars based on its authority to 
stop immoral activity, such as, for example, women pairing with other 
women, women dancing with other women and women dressing like 
men.64 Thus, the court expressly validated the results of Nickola and 
62. Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 22, Val/erga (No.1 Civ. 18184). The brief wist-
fully concludes, "American society has not yet fallen so low." Id. at 23. Shockingly, the court 
responded to this petition and granted rehearing. After investigating the attorney general's 
arguments about legislative history, the court of appeal reaffirmed its initial opinion (reversing 
the trial court opinion) in July of 1959, approximately six months after the first opinion. Vallerga 
v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 343 P.2d 54, 57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959). 
63. It is concluded, therefore, that subdivision (e) purports to authorize revocation of 
a license without requiring anything more to be shown than that the premises are a 
resort for certain classes of persons, and as such is unconstitutional for the reasons set 
forth in the Stoumen case. Language in the Kershaw and Nickola cases contrary to this 
construction of subdivision (e) of section 24200 is disapproved. 
Vallerga, 347 P.2d at 912. 
64. In the petition for modification, it was noted that the opinion's summary of "women 
kissing other women" distorted the record, which actually consisted of testimony from an agent 
who, when asked "whether he had ever observed expressions of affection between the patrons, 
his answer was:" 
Yes, TO A MINOR DEGREE ... on SOME OCCASIONS ..• you would see a female 
with her arms around another female, or kissing themselves on the cheeks and neck. 
ONCE IN A WHILE you would see that. 
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Kershaw.65 Even as it proceeded to strip lesbians and gay men of our 
rights as human beings, and locate us concretely and absolutely in the 
category "sex pervert," the court claimed for itself evenhandedness: 
This is not to say that homosexuals might properly be held to a 
higher degree of moral conduct than are heterosexuals. But any 
public display which manifests sexual desires, whether they be het-
erosexual or homosexual in nature may, and historically have been, 
suppressed and regulated in a moral society.66 
While uttering this pronouncement of equality, the Vallerga court then 
went on to reveal its utter opposition to it. To the California Supreme 
Court in 1959, heterosexual romance - men dancing with women, 
women dancing with men, women dressed to attract men, men 
dressed to attract women, even perhaps, a man in a bar kissing a 
woman, simply qid not constitute a "public display which manifests 
sexual desires . . . ."67 This astounding claim of equality reveals the 
deep heterosexist arrogance and contempt with which the court 
pushed lesbians and gay men behind the specter of sexual perversion. 
The court seemingly rejected the hateful arguments of the Attorney 
General which warned that if allowed to congregate, homosexuals 
would "metastasize,"68 and chose, instead, rhetoric about equality. 
But, as the attorneys for the First and Last Chance argued in their 
Petition for Modification of Opinion Without Change in the Judgment, and Petition for Rehear-
ing at 57k, Val/ergo (S.F. 20285). 
65. The court adopted the Attorney General's argument that "[c]onduct which may fall 
short of aggressive and uninhibited participation in fulfilling the sexual urges of homosexuals ... 
may nevertheless offend good morals and decency by displays in public which do no more than 
manifest such urges." 317 P.2d at 912 (citations omitted). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Petition for Modification of Opinion Without Change in the Judgment, and Petition for 
Rehearing at 4, Val/ergo (S.F. 20285). The winners and amicus petitioned the California 
Supreme Court for a Modification of Opinion. They argued that dicta in the court's opinion was 
"unconsciously influenced by the ancient and outmoded misconceptions, prejudices, and false 
taboos regarding sexual behavior in general, and homosexuality in particular, expressed by the 
Deputy Attorney General •... " Id. They cited as evidence Mr. Manuel's arguments that "the 
Legislature had adopted the policy of 'discouraging and stamping out homosexuality,' " and that 
homosexuality was a disease that if" 'left unfettered' could 'metastasize throughout the commu-
nity ••• .''' Id. at 4-5. The State of California had previously invoked this medical model in 
Nickola: 
There are many who argue that actually homosexuals and sexual perverts are sick 
persons who should not be treated like criminals. Such a philosophical argument may 
be a valid one but it does not detract from the right of the State to take effective 
measures to preclude that type of sickness from adversely affecting the community as a 
whole. The gathering of such afflicted persons with regularity in a premises dispensing 
alcoholic beverages has been determined by the Legislature to constitute a danger to 
the health, safety and morals of the People of the State and that determination should 
be upheld. 
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(unusual) Petition for Modification, the Vallerga opinion "equates 
immoral conduct with anything that reveals homosexual nature.,,69 
This, of course, is the heart of the conduct/status distinction, and 
one of the primary reasons that it makes no sense. As soon as the 
lesbian has done anything to identify herself as a lesbian, that conduct 
strips her of her pure identity as a human being and marks her as 
immoral and unfit. That was the message the California Supreme 
Court sent to lesbians and gay men in 1959. 
Perhaps one explanation for the shoddy and disappointing por-
trayal of lesbians and gay men that ultimately prevailed in these cases 
was our lack of legal representation and standing. These cases were 
brought on behalf of the bars' owners, whose attitudes seemingly 
ranged from shrewd charity to distaste. As mentioned above, Sol 
Stoumen testified that he threw "homos" out of his bar.70 Pearl Ker-
shaw's attitude toward her patrons was much more ambiguous, as was 
her own sexual identity.71 In the proceedings designed to take away 
Hazel Nickola's license, a bartender testified that she had told him 
that it was a gay bar. But Hazel Nickola "stated when she told Mr. 
Nelson she had a 'gay' crowd she meant a hilarious, jovial crowd."72 
The right of the public authorities to prohibit gatherings or congregation of per-
sons during the prevalence of an epidemic and for such purposes to close or recognize 
the closing of public places [or] institutions has frequently been recognized or assumed. 
Under the police power the State has the power to place in quarantine persons 
suffering from dangerous communicable diseases such as tUberculosis, leprosy, small 
pox, typhus fever and a number of other diseases. 
Respondent's Brief at 50-51, Nickola (1 Civ. No. 18014). 
69. Petition for Modification of Opinion Without Change in the Judgment, and Petition for 
Rehearing at 57m, Vallerga (S.F. 20285). The brief also complained that the court made too 
much of the evidence that "a patron complimented and kissed a policewoman disguised as n 
lesbian." Id. 
70. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In fact, the gay rights issues that ultimately 
prevailed in Stoumen constituted only a handful of pages in Stoumen's briefing. His main argu-
ments were a species of estoppel and procedural due process claims focused on the fundamental 
unfairness in the ABC proceeding against him after he had "arranged" to settle the dispute. See 
discussion supra note 5. 
71. Accusation, Kershaw (No. 17693). The only hint in the record is the police allegation 
that :'the licensee, Pearl Kershaw, 'goosed' a male patron in a lewd manner." Id. Kershaw's 
personal situation was at least ambiguous in the record: 
"Agent: You are married? 
Kershaw: I guess you could say that." 
Unpaginated Hearing Transcript, Kershaw (No. 278,421). 
72. Accusation at 16, Kershaw (No. 17693). That denial was impeached with evidence of a 
speech that she had made one afternoon: 
At one point during the afternoon Hazel Nickola, the licensee, cut off the music from 
the juke box, called for silence and made the following speech: 
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Her own attorney conceded that "if a person seeks and obtains sexual 
satisfaction with a person of the same sex, that person ... would be a 
sexual pervert."73 One aspect of the evidence against Hazel's was that 
a white man kissed a Filipino man on the cheek three times.74 The bar 
owner's own counsel characterized that conduct as "reprehensible. "75 
The record in Vallerga suggests that the owner of the First and Last 
Chance had been told by his attorney that he could not get rid of 
homosexuals if they were orderly. 
The best representation of gay men and lesbians came from the 
attorneys who represented Sol Stoumen in the Black Cat case in 
1951.76 In fact, lesbian and gay rights became something of a cause for 
these attorneys, who appeared as amicus in the subsequent gay bar 
cases. Those attorneys offered the appellate courts a massive amount 
of scientific and sociological data, including the Kinsey report, in an 
attempt to refute the popular attitudes reflected by the legislature, the 
Attorney General and most of the judges. In Vallerga, they suggested 
a picture of the lesbian that bettered any dream of the Daughters of 
Bilitis:77 "Lesbians are generally so notoriously circumspect and 
moral and conform to the proprieties of good public behavior that it is 
rare to find any state which has applied its sex statutes to them (At 
common law, the statutes had no application to lesbians.)."78. In other 
words, even the best of these lawyers defended lesbian rights by por-
traying lesbians as a group quite indistinguishable from the D.A.R. or 
the P.T.A?9 
[She asked the. patrons not to break bottles or glasses because it ate into her meager 
profit.] She stated that she was their friend and they should realize that she is their 
friend; that while she was in the premises no one would bother them. 
[d. at 7. The Attorney General used that speech against her: 
Why should dancers in a tavern on a Sunday afternoon be assured that while they were 
on the premises no one would bother them unless there was an attempt to convey to 
such patrons that the proprietress would do all that she could to maintain the premises 
as it was; namely, a resort for sexual perverts. 
Id. at 25. 
73. Petition for Hearing at 4, Nickola, (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
74. Reporter's Transcript at 35, Nickola, (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
75. Petition for Hearing at 9, Nickoia, (No.1 Civ. 18014). 
76. The attorneys were Morris Lowenthal, Juliet Lowenthal and Karl O. Lyon. 
77. The Daughters of Bilitis ("DOB") was a national lesbian organization founded in 1955. 
MARTIN & LYON, supra note 48, at 8. Its founders concede, "It seems old fashioned now ... but 
one of DOB's goals was to teach the lesbian a 'mode of behavior and dress acceptable to soci-
ety.'" Id. at 75. 
78. Petition for Modification of Opinion Without Change in Judgment, and Petition for 
Rehearing at 57c, n.*, Val/erga, (S.F. 20285). But see, RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW 
(1992) (Robson refutes this point in her book on lesbians and the law). . 
79. Daughters of the American Revolution (D.A.R.), Parent Teacher Association (P.T.A.). 
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The trial court files in Vallerga reveal an antidote to the sordid or 
sanitized representation received by lesbians in these cases. The DepM 
uty Attorney General described an incident in which Shirleen and 
then Buddy made the error of trying to romance Marge Gwinn, the 
undercover police officer. The court heard testimony that, when 
Gwinn was revealed to be a policewoman, Buddy expressed regret: 
"It's a shame, because I had become quite fond of Marge."BO Shirleen 
told Gwinn, "You're a cute little butch."B1 Shirleen and Buddy were 
literally flirting with danger; flirting with the law. As Merril MushM 
room wrote in her essay, How the Butch Does It: 1959, "The butch is 
sultry. The butch is arrogant. The butch is tough."82 
The antidote to the misrepresentation of lesbians in law - someM 
how without gender, without race, without class, without sexual desire 
- is for lesbians to reveal ourselves, as human beings, yes, but also as 
sexual beings, as women, as women with complex racial and class 
identities. When we do that, we can appropriate Bertha Harris' 
praise: "Such work[] ... show[s] what the lesbian is becoming: a creaM 
ture of tooth and claw, of passion and purpose: unassimilable, aweM 
some, dangerous, outrageous, different: distinguished."B3 
80. Respondents' Petition for a Hearing in the Supreme Court at 7, Va/lerga (SF 20285). 
81. Id. at 6. " 
82. Mereil Mushroom, How the Butch Does It: 1959, in THE PERSISTENT DESIRE, supra 
note 26, at 133. 
83. Bertha Harris, What We Mean to Say: Notes Toward Defining the Nature of Lesbian 
Literature, 3 HERESIES 5, 8 (1977). " 
